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Abstract
In this paper we study the Kyle-Back strategic insider trading equilibrium model in which
the insider has an instantaneous information on an asset, assumed to follow an Ornstein-
Uhlenback-type dynamics that allows possible influence by the market price. Such a model
exhibits some further interplay between insider’s information and the market price, and it
is the first time being put into a rigorous mathematical framework of the recently devel-
oped conditional mean-field stochastic differential equation (CMFSDEs). With the help of
the “reference probability measure” concept in filtering theory, we shall first prove a general
well-posedness result for a class of linear CMFSDEs, which is new in the literature of both
filtering theory and mean-field SDEs, and will be the foundation for the underlying strategic
equilibrium model. Assuming some further Gaussian structures of the model, we find a closed
form of optimal intensity of trading strategy as well as the dynamic pricing rules. We shall
also substantiate the well-posedness of the resulting optimal closed-loop system, whence the
existence of Kyle-Back equilibrium. Our result recovers many existing results as special cases.
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1
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, A.S. Kyle [21] first proposed a sequential equilibrium model of asset pricing
with asymmetric information. The model was then extended by K. Back [2] to the continuous
time version, and has since known as the Kyle-Back strategic insider trading equilibrium model.
Roughly speaking, in such a model it is assumed that there are two types of traders in a risk
neutral market: one informed (insider) trader vs. many uninformed (noise) traders. The insider
“sees” both (possibly future) value of the fundamental asset as well as its market value, priced
by the market makers, and acts strategically in a non-competitive manner. The noise traders, on
the other hand, act independently with only market information of the asset. Finally, the market
makers set the price of the asset, in a Bertrand competition fashion, based on the historical
information of the collective market actions of all traders, without knowing identify the insider.
The so-called Kyle-Back equilibrium is a closed-loop system in which the insider maximizes his/her
expected return in a market efficient manner (i.e., following the given market pricing rule).
There has been a large number of literature on this topic. We refer to, e.g., [2,4,9,14,15,17–21]
and the references therein for both discrete and continuous time models. It is noted, however, that
in most of these works only the case of static information is considered, that is, it is assumed that
information that the insider could observe is “time-invariant”, often as the fundamental price at a
given future moment. Mathematically, this amounts to saying that the insider has the knowledge
of a given random variable whose value cannot be detected from the market information at current
time. It is often assumed that the system has a certain Gaussian structure (e.g., the future price
is a Gaussian random variable), so that the optimal strategies can be calculated explicitly. The
situation will become more complicated when the fundamental price progresses as a stochastic
process {vt, t ≥ 0} and the insider is able to observe the price process dynamically in a “non-
anticipative” manner. The asymmetric information nature of the problem has conceivably led to
the use of filtering techniques in the study of the Kyle-Back model, and we refer to, e.g., [1] and [6]
for the static information case, and to, e.g., [9] and [17] for the dynamic information case. It is
noted that in [6] it is further assumed that the actions of noise traders may have some “memory”,
so that the observation process in the filtering problem is driven by a fractional Brownian motion,
adding technical difficulties in a different aspect. We also note that the Kyle-Back model has been
continuously extended in various directions. For example, in a static information setting, [16]
recently considered the case when noise trading volatility is a stochastic process, and in the
dynamic information case [10–12] studied the Kyle-Back equilibrium for the defaultable underlying
asset via dynamic Markov bridges, exhibiting further theoretical potential of the problem.
In this paper we are interested in a generalized Kyle-Back equilibrium model in a dynamic in-
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formation setting, in which the asset dynamics is of the form of an Ornstein-Uhlenback SDE whose
drift also contains market sentiment (e.g., supply and demand, earning base, etc.), quantified by
the market price. The problem is then naturally imbedded into a (linear) filtering problem in
which both state and observation dynamics contain the filtered signal process (see §2 for details).
We note that such a structure is not covered by the existing filtering theory, and thus it is inter-
esting in its own right. In fact, under the setting of this paper the signal-observation dynamics
form a “coupled” (linear) conditional mean-field stochastic differential equations (CMFSDEs, for
short) whose well-posedness, to the best of our knowledge, is new.
The main objective of this paper is thus two-fold. First, we shall look for a rigorous framework
on which the well-posedness of the underlying CMFSDE can be established. The main device of
our approach is the “reference probability measure” that is often seen in the nonlinear filtering
theory (see, e.g., [24]). Roughly speaking, we give the observable market movement a “prior”
probability distribution so that it is a Brownian motion that is independent of the martingale
representing the aggregated trading actions of the noisy traders, and we then prove that the
original signal-observation SDEs have a weak solution. More importantly, we shall prove that the
uniqueness holds among all weak solutions whose laws are absolutely continuous with respect to
the reference probability measure. We should note that such a uniqueness in particular resolves
a long-standing issue on the Kyle-Back equilibrium model: the identification of the total traded
volume movements and the innovation process of the corresponding filtering problem, which has
been argued either only heuristically or by economic instinct in the literature (see, e.g., [1]). The
second goal of this paper is to identify the Kyle-Back equilibrium, that is, the optimal closed-loop
system for this new type of partially observable optimization problem. Assuming a Gaussian
structure and the linearity of the CMFSDEs, we give the explicit solutions to the insider’s trading
intensity and justify the well-posedness of the closed-loop system (whence the “existence” of the
equilibrium). These solutions in particular cover many existing results as special cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give the preliminaries of the
Kyle-Back equilibrium model and formulate the strategic insider trading problem. In section 3
we formulate a general form of linear CMFSDE and introduce the notion of its solutions and their
uniqueness. We state the main well-posedness result, calculate its explicit solutions in the case
of deterministic coefficients, and discuss an important extension to the unbounded coefficients
case. Section 4 will be devoted to the proof of the main well-posedness theorem. In section 5
we characterize the optimal trading strategy, and give a first order necessary condition for the
optimal intensity, and finally in section 6 we focus on the synthesis analysis, and validate the
Kyle-Back equilibrium. In some spacial cases, we give the closed-form solutions, and compare
them to the existing results.
3
2 Problem Formulation
In this section we describe a continuous time Kyle-Back equilibrium model that will be investigated
in this paper, as well as related technical settings.
We begin by assuming that all randomness of the market comes from a common complete
probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which is defined 2-dimensional Brownian motion B = (Bv, Bz),
where Bv = {Bvt : t ≥ 0} represents the noise of the fundamental value dynamics, and Bz =
{Bzt : t ≥ 0} represents the collective action of the noise traders. For notational clarity, we denote
Fv = {FBvt : t ≥ 0} and Fz
△
= {FBzt : t ≥ 0} to be the filtrations generated by Bv and Bz,
respectively, and denote F = Fv ∨ Fz, with the usual P-augmentation such that it satisfies the
usual hypotheses (cf. e.g., [25]).
Further, throughout the paper we will denote, for a generic Euclidean space X, regardless of
its dimension, 〈 ·, · 〉 and | · | to be its inner product and norm, respectively. We denote the space
of continuous functions defined on [0, T ] with the usual sup-norm by C([0, T ];X), and we shall
make use of the following notations:
• For any sub-σ-field G ⊆ FT and 1 ≤ p < ∞, Lp(G;X) denotes the space of all X-valued,
G-measurable random variables ξ such that E|ξ|p <∞. As usual, ξ ∈ L∞(G;X) means that
it is G-measurable and bounded.
• For 1 ≤ p <∞, LpF([0, T ];X) denotes the space of all X-valued, F-progressively measurable
processes ξ satisfying E
∫ T
0 |ξt|pdt <∞. The meaning of L∞F ([0, T ];X) is defined similarly.
Throughout this paper we assume that all the processes are 1-dimensional, but higher dimensional
cases can be easily deduced without substantial difficulties. Therefore, we will often drop X(= R)
from the notation. Also, throughout the paper we shall denote all “Lp-norms” by ‖·‖p, regardless
its being Lp(G) or LpF([0, T ]), when the context is clear.
Consider a given stock whose fundamental value (or its return) is V = {Vt : t ≥ 0} traded on
a finite time interval [0, T ]. There are three types of agents in the market:
(i) The insider, who directly observes the realization of the value Vt at any time t ∈ [0, T ] and
submits his order Xt at t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) The noise traders, who have no direct information of the given asset, and (collectively)
submit an order Zt at t ∈ [0, T ] in the form
Zt =
∫ t
0
σzt dB
z
t , t ≥ 0, (2.1)
where σz = {σzt : t ≥ 0} is a given continuous deterministic function satisfying σzt > 0.
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(iii) The market makers, who observe only the total traded volume
Yt = Xt + Zt, t ≥ 0, (2.2)
and set the market price of the underlying asset at each time t, denoted by Pt, based on the
observed information FYt
△
= σ{Ys, s ≤ t}. We denote St △= E[(Vt − Pt)2] to be the measure
of the discrepancy between market price and fundamental value of the asset.
We now give a more precise description of the two main ingredients in the model above:
the dynamics of market price P and the fundamental value V . First, in the same spirit of the
original Kyle-Back model, we can assume that the market price P is the result of a Bertrand-
type competition among the market makers (cf. e.g., [4]), and therefore should be taken as
Pt = E[Vt|FYt ], at each time t ≥ 0. Mathematically speaking, this amounts to saying that the
market price is set to minimize the error St, among all FYt -measurable random variables in L2(Ω),
hence the “best estimator” that the market maker is able to choose given the information FYt .
It is easy to see that under such a choice one must have E[(Vt − Pt)Yt] = 0, that is, the market
makers should expect a zero profit at each time t ∈ [0, T ]. It is worth noting that, however, unlike
the static case (i.e., Vt ≡ v), the process P is no longer a (P,FY )-martingale in general.
Next, in this paper we shall also assume that the dynamics of the value of the stock V = {Vt}
takes the form of an Itoˆ process: dVt = Ftdt+ σ
v
t dB
v
t , t ≥ 0 (this would easily be the case if, e.g.,
the interest rate is non-zero). Furthermore, we shall assume that the drift Ft = F (t, Vt, Pt), t ≥ 0.
Here, the dependence of F on the market price Pt is based on the following rationale: the value
of the stock is often affected by factors such as supply and demand, the earnings base (cash flow
per share), or more generally, the market sentiment, which all depend on the market price of the
stock. Consequently, taking the Gaussian structure into consideration, in what follows we shall
assume that the process V satisfies the following linear SDE:{
dVt = (ftVt + gtPt + ht)dt+ σ
v
t dB
v
t = (ftVt + gtE[Vt|FYt ] + ht)dt+ σvt dBvt , t ≥ 0,
V0 ∼ N(v0, s0).
(2.3)
where the functions ft, gt, ht and σ
v
t are all deterministic continuous differentiable functions with
respect to time t ∈ [0, T ], and N(v0, s0) is a normal random variable with mean v0 and standard
deviation s0.
Continuing, given the Gaussian structure of the dynamics, it is reasonable to assume that
the insider’s optimal trading strategy (in terms of “number of shares”) is of the form (see, e.g.,
[1, 2, 4, 17,21]):
dXt = βt(Vt − Pt)dt, t ≥ 0, (2.4)
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where βt > 0 is a deterministic continuous differentiable function with respect to time t in [0, T),
known as the insider trading intensity. Consequently, it follows from (2.2) that the total traded
volume process observed by the market makers can be expressed as
dYt = βt(Vt − Pt)dt+ σzt dBzt = βt(Vt − E[Vt|FYt ])dt+ σzt dBzt , t ≥ 0. (2.5)
We note that SDEs (2.3) and (2.5) form a (linear) conditional mean-field SDE (CMFSDE),
which is beyond the scope of the traditional filtering theory. Such SDE have been studied in [8]
and [13] in general nonlinear forms, but none of them covers the one in this form. In fact,
if we further allow the function h in (2.3) to be an FY -adapted process, as many stochastic
control problems do, then (2.3) and (2.5) would become a fully convoluted CMFSDE whose well-
posedness, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied in the literature, even in the linear
form. We should mention that the equation (2.5) in the case when Vt ≡ v was already noted
in [1] and [6], but without addressing the uniqueness of the solution. In the next sections we shall
establish a mathematical framework so these SDEs can be studied rigorously.
Given the dynamics (2.3) and (2.5), our main purpose now is to find an optimal trading
intensity β for the insider to maximize his/her expected wealth, whence the Kyle-Back equilibrium.
More specifically, denote the wealth process of the insider by W = {Wt : t ≥ 0}, and assume that
the strategy is self-financing (cf. e.g., [7]), then the total wealth of the insider over time duration
[0, T ], based on the market price made by the market makers, should be
WT =
∫ T
0
XtdPt = XTPT −
∫ T
0
βt(Vt − Pt)Ptdt =
∫ T
0
βt(Vt − Pt)(PT − Pt)dt. (2.6)
Here in the above we used a simple integration by parts and definition (2.4). Thus the optimization
problems can be described as
sup
β
E[WT ]
△
= sup
β
J(β) = sup
β
∫ T
0
βtE[(Vt − Pt)(PT − Pt)]dt. (2.7)
Remark 2.1. We should remark that the simple form of optimization problem (2.7) is due
largely to the linearity of the dynamics (2.3) and (2.5), as well as the Gaussian assumption on
the initial state v. These lead to a Gaussian structure, whence the trading strategy (2.4). The
general nonlinear and/or non-Gaussian Kyle-Back model requires further study of CMFSDE and
associated filtering problem, and one should seek optimal control from a larger class of “admissible
controls”. In that case the first order condition studied in this paper will become a Pontryagin
type stochastic maximum principle (see, for example, [8]), and the solution is expected to be much
more involved. We will address such general problems in our future publications.
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We end this section by noting that the main idea for solving the CMFSDE is to introduce the
so-called reference probability space in nonlinear filtering literature (see, e.g., [24]), which can be
described as follows.
Assumption 2.2. There exists a probability space (Ω0,F0,Q0) on which the process (Bvt , Yt),
t ∈ [0, T ], is a 2-dimensional continuous martingale, where Bv is a standard Brownian motion
and Y is the observation process with quadratic variation 〈Y 〉t =
∫ t
0 (σ
z
s)
2ds. The probability
measure Q0 will be referred to as the reference measure.
We remark that Assumption 2.2 amounts to saying that we are giving a prior distribution to
the price process Y = {Yt : t ≥ 0} that the market maker is observing, which is not unusual in
statistical modeling, and will facilitate the discussion greatly. A natural example is the canonical
space: Ω0
△
= C0([0, T ];R
2), the space of all 2-dimensional continuous functions null at zero;
F0 △= B(Ω0); F0t
△
= Bt(Ω
0) = σ{ω(· ∧ t) : ω ∈ Ω0}, t ∈ [0, T ]; and (Bv, Y ) is the canonical
process. In the case σz ≡ 1, Q0 is the Wiener measure.
3 The Linear Conditional Mean-field SDEs
In this section we study the linear conditional mean-field SDEs (CMFSDE) (2.3) and (2.5) that
play an important role in this paper. In fact, let us consider a slightly more general case that is
useful in applications:{
dXt = {ftXt + gtE[Xt|FYt ] + ht}dt+ σ1t dB1t , X0 = v;
dYt = {HtXt +GtE[Xt|FYt ]}dt+ σ2t dB2t , Y0 = 0,
(3.1)
where B
△
= (B1, B2) is a standard Brownian motion defined on a given probability space (Ω,F ,P),
and v ∼ N(v0, s0) is independent of B. In light of Assumption 2.2, throughout this section we
shall assume the following:
Assumption 3.1. (i) The coefficients f , g, σ1, σ2, G, and H are all deterministic, continuous
functions; and σit > 0, i = 1, 2, for all t ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) there exists a probability space (Ω0,F0,Q0) on which the process (B1t , Yt), t ∈ [0, T ], is
a 2-dimensional continuous martingale, such that B1 is a standard Q0-Brownian motion, and
〈Y 〉t =
∫ t
0 |σ2s |2ds, t ∈ [0, T ], Q0-a.s.;
(iii) the coefficient h is an FY -adapted, continuous process, such that
EQ
0
[
sup
0≤t≤T
|ht|2
]
<∞.
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Remark 3.2. The Assumption 3.1-(iii) amounts to saying that the process h is defined on the
reference probability space (Ω0,F0,Q0), and adapted to the Brownian filtration FY , as we often
see in the stochastic control with partial observations (cf. [5]).
3.1 The General Result
To simplify notations in what follows we shall assume that σ1 = σ2 ≡ 1. We first introduce
two definitions of the solution to CMFSDE (3.1). Let P(R) denote all probability measures on
(R,B(R)), where B(R) is the Borel σ-field of R, and µ ∼ N(v0, s0) ∈ P(R) denotes the normal
distribution with mean v0 and variance s0.
Definition 3.3. Let µ ∈ P(R) be given. An eight-tuple (Ω,F ,F,P;X,Y,B1, B2) is called a weak
solution to CMFSDE (3.1) with initial distribution µ if
(i) (B1, B2) is an F-Brownian motion under P;
(ii) (X,Y,B1, B2) satisfies (3.1), P-a.s.;
(iii) X0 ∼ µ; and is independent of (B1, B2) under P.
Definition 3.4. A weak solution (Ω,F ,F,P;X,Y,B1, B2) is called a Q0-weak solution to CMFSDE
(3.1) if
(i) there exists a probability measure P0 on (Ω0,F0), and processes (X0, Y 0, B1,0, B2,0) defined
on (Ω0,F0,P0), whose law under P0 is the same as that of (X,Y,B1, B2) under P; and
(ii) P0 ∼ Q0.
In what follows for any Q0-weak solution, we shall consider only its copy on the reference
measurable space (Ω0,F0), and we shall still denote the solution by (X,Y,B1, B2).
The uniqueness of the solutions to CMFSDE (3.1) is a more delicate issue. In fact, even the
weak uniqueness (in the usual sense) for CMFSDE (2.3) and (2.5) is not clear. However, we have
a much better hope, at least in the linear case, for Q0-solutions. We first introduce the following
“Q0-pathwise uniqueness”.
Definition 3.5. The CMFSDE (3.1) is said to have “Q0-pathwise uniqueness” if for any two
Q0-weak solutions (Ω0,F0,F0,Pi;Xi, Y i, B1,i, B2,i), i = 1, 2, such that
(i) X10 = X
2
0 ; and
(ii) Q0{(B1,1t , Y 1t ) = (B1,2t , Y 2t ),∀t ∈ [0, T ]} = 1,
then it holds that Q0{(X1t , B2,1t ) = (X2t , B2,2t ),∀t ∈ [0, T ]} = 1, and P1 = P2.
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Theorem 3.6. Assume that Assumption 3.1 is in force, and further that h is bounded. Let
µ ∼ N(v0, s0) be given. Then CMFSDE (3.1) possesses a weak solution with initial distribution
µ, denoted by (Ω,F ,F,P;X,Y,B1, B2).
Moreover, if we denote Pt = E
P[Xt|FYt ], t ∈ [0, T ], then P satisfies the following SDE: dPt = [(ft + gt)Pt + ht]dt+ StHt{dYt − [Ht +Gt]Ptdt}, t ∈ [0, T ],
P0 = v0.
(3.2)
where St =Var(Pt) satisfies the Riccati equation:
dSt = [1 + 2ftSt −H2t S2t ]dt, S0 = s0. (3.3)
Furthermore, the weak solution can be chosen as Q0-weak solution, and the Q0-pathwise
uniqueness holds.
We remark that Theorem 3.6 does not imply that CMFSDE (3.1) has a strong solution, as
not every weak solution is a Q0-weak solution. The proof of Theorem 3.6 is a bit lengthy, we shall
defer it to next section. We nevertheless present a lemma below, which will be frequently used in
our discussion, so as to facilitate the argument in the next section.
To begin with, we consider any filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) on which is defined a
standard Brownian Motion (B1t , B
2
t ). We assume that F = F
(B1,B2). For any η ∈ L2F([0, T ]) we
define Lη to be the solution to the following SDE,
dLt = LtηtdB
2
t , t ≥ 0, L0 = 1. (3.4)
In other words, Lη is a local martingale in the form of the Dole´ans-Dade stochastic exponential:
Lηt = exp
{∫ t
0
ηsdB
2
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
|ηs|2ds
}
. (3.5)
Next let α ∈ L2F([0, T ]) and consider the following SDE:
dYt = (αt + h(Y )t)dt+ dB
2
t , Y0 = 0, (3.6)
where h : [0, T ]×C([0, T ]) 7→ R is “progressively measurable” in the sense that, it is a measurable
function such that for each t ∈ [0, T ], h(y)t = h(y·∧t)t for y ∈ C([0, T ]). (A simple case would
be h(y)t = h˜(yt), where h˜ is a measurable function.) We should note that in general the well-
posedness of SDE (3.6) is non-trivial without any specific conditions on h, but in what follows we
shall assume a priori that (3.6) has a (weak) solution on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). We
say that h ∈ L2
FY
([0, T ]) if ht = h(Y )t, t ∈ [0, T ], such that E
∫ T
0 |h(Y )t|2dt < ∞. We have the
following lemma.
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Lemma 3.7. Suppose that the SDE (3.6) has a solution Yt, t ∈ [0, T ], for given αt ∈ L2
FB
1 ([0, T ])
and h ∈ L2
FY
([0, T ]) on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let β be given by
dβt = αtdt+ dB
2
t , t ≥ 0, β0 = 0. (3.7)
Assume further that L−(α+h), the solution to (3.4) with η = −(α + h), is an (F,P)-martingale.
Then, for any t ∈ [0, T ], it holds that
EP[αt|FYt ] = EP[αt|Fβt ], ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. (3.8)
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove EP[αT |FYT ] = EP[αT |FβT ], as the cases for t < T are
analogous. To this end, we define a new probability measure Q on (Ω,FT ) by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
FT
= L
−(α+h)
T ,
where L−(α+h) is the solution to the SDE (3.4) with η = −(α+ h), and it is a true martingale on
[0, T ] by assumption. By Girsanov Theorem, the process (B1, Y ) is a standard Brownian motion
on [0, T ] under Q.
Now define L¯t = 1/L
−(α+h)
t , then L¯ satisfies the following SDE on (Ω,FT ,Q):
dL¯t = L¯t(αt + ht)dYt, t ∈ [0, T ], L¯0 = 1. (3.9)
Furthermore, by the Kallianpur-Striebel formula, we have
EP[αT |FYT ] =
EQ[αT L¯T |FYT ]
EQ[L¯T |FYT ]
. (3.10)
On the other hand, L¯ has the explicit form:
L¯T = exp
{∫ T
0
[αt + ht]dYt − 1
2
∫ T
0
[αt + ht]
2dt
}
(3.11)
= exp
{∫ T
0
htdYt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|ht|2dt+
∫ T
0
αtdYt − 1
2
∫ T
0
[|αt|2 + 2htαt]dt
}
△
= L¯0TΛT ,
where
L¯0T
△
= exp
{∫ T
0
htdYt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|ht|2dt
}
; ΛT
△
= exp
{∫ T
0
αtdYt − 1
2
∫ T
0
[[αt]
2 + 2htαt]dt
}
.
Note that h is FY -adapted, so is L¯0T . We derive from (3.10) that
EP[αT |FYT ] =
EQ[αTΛT |FYT ]
EQ[ΛT |FYT ]
. (3.12)
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Now define Y 1t =
∫ t
0 hsds. Since h is F
Y -adapted, so is Y 1, and consequently βt = Yt − Y 1t ,
t ≥ 0 is FY -adapted. Moreover, since (B1, Y ) is a standard Brownian motion under Q, and α is
FB
1
-adapted, we conclude that αt is independent of Yt under Q. Therefore, using integration by
parts we obtain that
ΛT = exp
{∫ T
0
αtdβt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|αt|2dt
}
(3.13)
= exp
{
αTβT −
∫ T
0
βtdαt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|αt|2dt
}
.
Since α is independent of Y under Q, and βt, t ∈ [0, T ] is FYT -measurable, a Monotone Class
argument shows that EQ[ΛT |FYT ] is FβT measurable; and similarly, EQ[αTΛT |FYT ] is also FβT mea-
surable. Consequently EP[αT |FYT ] is FβT measurable, thanks to (3.10).
Finally, noting Fβ ⊆ FY we have
EP[αT |FYT ] = EP{EP[αT |FYT ]|FβT } = EP[αT |FβT ], (3.14)
proving the lemma.
3.2 Deterministic Coefficient Cases
An important special case is when all the coefficients in the linear CMFSDE (3.1) are deterministic.
In this case we expect that the solution (X,Y ) is Gaussian, and it can be solved in a much
more explicit way. The following linear CMFSDE will be useful in the study of insider trading
equilibrium model in the latter half of the paper. dXt = [ftXt + gtE[Xt|F
Y
t ] + ht]dt+ σ
1
t dB
1
t , X0 = v;
dYt = Ht(Xt − E[Xt|FYt ])dt+ σ2t dB2t , Y0 = 0,
(3.15)
where v ∼ N(v0, s0) and is independent of (B1, B2) and all the coefficients are assumed to be
deterministic.
3.2.1 Bounded Coefficients Case
In light of Theorem 3.6 let us introduce the following functions:
kt =
H2t St
|σ2t |2
, lt =
HtSt
σ2t
, t ≥ 0. (3.16)
where S is the solution to the following Riccati equation
dSt
dt
= (σ1t )
2 + 2ftSt − l2t , t ≥ 0, S0 = s0. (3.17)
We have the following result.
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Proposition 3.8. Let Assumption 3.1 be in force, and assume further that the process h in
(3.1) is also a deterministic and continuous function. Let (X,Y ) be the solution of (3.15) on the
probability space (Ω,F ,P), and denote Pt = EP[Xt|FYt ], t ≥ 0. Then X and P have the following
explicit forms respectively: for t ≥ 0, it holds P-a.s. that
Xt = Pt + φ1(t, 0)
[
v − v0 +
∫ t
0
φ1(0, r)(σ
1
rdB
1
r − lrdYr)
]
; (3.18)
Pt = φ2(t, 0)
{
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr + (v − v0)φ3(t, 0) (3.19)
+
∫ t
0
σ1rφ1(0, r)φ3(t, r)dB
1
r +
∫ t
0
[φ2(0, r)lr − φ1(0, r)φ3(t, r)lr]dB2r
}
,
where, for 0 ≤ r ≤ t,
φ1(t, r) = exp
{∫ t
r
(fu − ku)du
}
; φ2(t, r) = exp
{∫ t
r
(fu + gu)du
}
;
φ3(t, r) =
∫ t
r
φ1(u, 0)φ2(0, u)kudu.
(3.20)
Proof. We first note that the SDE (3.15) is a special case of (3.1) with G = −H. Then,
following the same argument of Theorem 3.6 one can show that when σ1 > 0 and σ2 > 0 are not
equal to 1, the SDE (3.2) for the process Pt = E
P[Xt|FYt ] reads
dPt = [(ft + gt)Pt + ht]dt+
HtSt
(σ2t )
2
dYt, P0 = v0, (3.21)
and St satisfies a Riccati equation
dSt
dt
= (σ2t )
2 + 2ftSt −
[HtSt
σ2t
]2
, S0 = s0. (3.22)
Now applying the Girsanov transformation we can define a new probability measure Q under
which (B1, Y ) is a continuous martingale, such that B1 is a standard Brownian motion, and
d 〈Y 〉t = |σ2t |2dt. Then, under Q, the dynamic of Vt
△
= Xt − Pt can be written as
dVt =
[
ft − H
2
t St
(σ2t )
2
]
Vtdt+ σ
1
t dB
1
t −
HtSt
σ2t
dYt
= [ft − kt]Vtdt+ σ1t dB1t − ltdYt, X0 − P0 = v − v0.
It then follows that the identity (3.18) holds Q-almost surely, and hence P-almost surely.
Similarly, applying the constant variation formula for the linear SDE (3.21) and noting (3.1)
we obtain that, with φ2(t, r) = exp(
∫ t
r (fu + gu)du), for 0 ≤ r, t ≤ T ,
Pt = φ2(t, 0)
{
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)
HrSr
(σ2r )
2
dYr
}
(3.23)
= φ2(t, 0)
{
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)
HrSr
(σ2r )
2
[Hr(Xr − Pr)dr + σ2rdB2r ]
}
.
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Now plugging (3.18) into (3.23), and applying Fubini, we have
Pt = φ2(t, 0)
{
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr + (v − v0)
∫ t
0
φ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)krdr
+
∫ t
0
φ1(0, r)σ
1
r
∫ t
r
φ1(u, 0)φ2(0, u)kududB
1
r
+
∫ t
0
[φ2(0, r)lr − φ1(0, r)lr
∫ t
r
φ1(u, 0)φ2(0, u)kudu]dB
2
r
}
(3.24)
= φ2(t, 0)
{
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr + (v − v0)φ3(t, 0)
+
∫ t
0
φ1(0, r)σ
1
rφ3(t, r)dB
1
r +
∫ t
0
[φ2(0, r)lr − φ1(0, r)φ3(t, r)lr]dB2r
}
,
where φ3(t, r)
△
=
∫ t
r φ1(u, 0)φ2(0, u)kudu. This proves (3.19), whence the proposition.
3.2.2 Unbounded Coefficients Case
We note that Theorem 3.6 as well as the discussion so far rely heavily on the assumption that
all the coefficients are bounded, especially H and G (see Assumption 3.1). However, in our
applications we will see that the coefficients H = −G = β, where β is the insider trading intensity
which, at least in the optimal case, will satisfy limt→T− βt = +∞, violating Assumption 3.1. In
other words, the closed-loop system will exhibit a certain Brownian “bridge” nature (see also,
e.g., [4, 10,11]), for which the well-posedness result of Theorem 3.6 actually does not apply.
To overcome such a conflict, we introduce the following relaxed version of Assumption 3.1.
Assumption 3.9. There exists a sequence {Tn}n≥1, with 0 < Tn ր T , and a sequence of proba-
bility measures {Qn}n≥1 on (Ω0,F0), satisfying
(i) Assumption 3.1 holds for each (Ω0,F0,Qn) over [0, Tn], n ≥ 1
(ii) Qn+1
∣∣
F0
Tn
= Qn, n ≥ 1.
We shall refer to the sequence of probability measures Q0 := {Qn}n≥1 as the reference family
of probability measures, and the associated sequence {Tn}n≥1 as the announcing sequence. Clearly,
if the reference measure Q0 exists, then Qn = Q0|F0
Tn
, n ≥ 1. It is known, however, that in the
dynamic observation case the Kyle-Back equilibrium may only exist on [0, T ) (see, e.g. [12] and
the references cited therein). In such a case the reference family would play a fundamental role.
A reasonable extension of the notion of Q0-weak solution over [0, T ) is as follows.
Definition 3.10. Let Q0 be a reference family of probability measures, with announcing sequence
{Tn}. A sequence {(Ω0,F0,Pn,Xn, Y n, B1,n, B2,n)}n≥1 is called a Q0-weak solution of (3.1) on
[0, T ) if for each n ≥ 1, (Ω0,F0,Pn,Xn, Y n, B1,n, B2,n) is a Qn-weak solution on [0, Tn].
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It is worth noting that if the coefficients of CMFSDE (3.1) satisfy Assumption 3.1 on each
sub-interval [0, Tn], then one can apply Theorem 3.6 for each n to get a Q0-solution. Furthermore,
since the solutions will be pathwisely unique under each Qn over [0, Tn], it is easy to check that
(Xn+1t , Y
n+1
t , B
1,n+1
t , B
2,n+1
t ) = (X
n
t , Y
n
t , B
1,n
t , B
2,n
t ), t ∈ [0, Tn], Qn-a.s. We can then define
a process (X,Y,B1, B2) on [0, T ) by simply setting (Xt, Yt, B
1
t , B
2
t ) = (X
n
t , Y
n
t , B
1,n
t , B
2,n
t ), for
t ∈ [0, Tn], n ≥ 1, and we shall refer to such a process as the Q0-solution on [0, T ). The Q0-
pathwise uniqueness on [0, T ) can be defined in an obvious way. We have the following extension
of Theorem 3.6, whose proof is left for the interested reader.
Theorem 3.11. Assume that Assumption 3.9 is in force, and let Q0 be the family of reference
measures with announcing sequence {Tn}. Assume further that Assumption 3.1 holds for each Qn
on [0, Tn]. Then CMFSDE (3.1) possesses a Q0-weak solution on [0, T ), and it is Q0-pathwisely
unique on [0, T ).
4 Proof of Theorem 3.6
In this section we prove Theorem 3.6. We begin by making the following reduction: it suffices to
consider the SDE (3.1) where the initial state X0 = v ≡ v0 is deterministic, that is, s0 = 0. Indeed,
suppose that (Xx, Y x) is a weak solution of (3.1) along with some probability space (Ω,F ,P) and
P-Brownian motion (B1, B2), and v is any random variable defined on (R,B(R)), with normal
distribution µ
△
= N(v0, s0), we define the product space
Ω˜
△
= Ω⊗ R, F˜ △= F ⊗B(R), P˜ △= P⊗ µ,
and write generic element of ω˜ ∈ Ω˜ as ω˜ = (ω, x). Then for each t ≥ 0, the mapping ω˜ 7→
Xxt (ω) defines a random variable on (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜), and x 7→ Xx0
△
= v(x) is a normal random variable
with distribution N(v0, s0) and is independent of (B
1, B2), by definition. Bearing this in mind,
throughout the section we shall assume that the initial state X0 = x is deterministic.
4.1 Existence
Our main idea to prove the existence of the weak solution is to “decouple” the state and observa-
tion equations in (3.1) by considering the dynamics of the filtered state process Pt
△
= EP[Xt|FYt ],
t ≥ 0, which is known to satisfy an SDE, thanks to linear (Kalman-Bucy) filtering theory.
To be more precise, we consider the following system of SDEs on the reference probability
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space (Ω,F ,Q0), on which (B1, Y ) is a Brownian motion:
dXt = [ftXt + gtPt + ht]dt+ dB
1
t , X0 = x;
dB2t = dYt − [HtXt +GtPt]dt, B20 = 0;
dPt = [(ft + gt)Pt + ht]dt+ StHt{dYt − [Ht +Gt]Ptdt}, P0 = x;
dSt = [2ftSt −H2t S2t + 1]dt, S0 = 0.
(4.1)
We note that by Assumption 3.1, all coefficients f, g,H,G are deterministic and h ∈ L2
FY
(C([0, T ])),
it is easy to see that the linear system (4.1) has a (pathwisely) unique solution (Xt, B
2
t , Pt) on
(Ω,F ,Q0).
Now let L = {Lt}t≥0 be the solution to the SDE:
dLt = Lt(HtXt +GtPt)dYt, L0 = 1. (4.2)
Then L is a positive Q0-local martingale, hence a Q0-supermartingale with EQ
0
[Lt] ≤ L0 = 1.
Furthermore, L can be written as the Dole´ans-Dade exponential:
Lt = exp{
∫ t
0
(HsXs +GsPs)dYs − 1
2
∫ t
0
|HsXs +GsPs|2ds
}
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.3)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that Assumption 3.1 holds, and further that h is bounded. Then the process
L = {Lt; t ≥ 0} is a true (F,Q0)-martingale on [0, T ].
Proof. We follow the idea of that in [5]. Since L is a supermartingale with EQ
0
[Lt] ≤ 1, we
need only show that EQ
0
[Lt] = 1, for all t ≥ 0. To this end, we define, for any ε > 0,
Lεt
△
=
Lt
1 + εLt
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then clearly 0 ≤ Lεt ≤ Lt ∧ 1ε , and an easy application of Itoˆ’s formula shows that
dLεt = −
εL2t [HtXt +GtPt]
2
(1 + εLt)3
dt+
Lt[HtXt +GtPt]
(1 + εLt)2
dYt, t ≥ 0; Lε0 =
1
1 + ε
. (4.4)
Since for each fixed ε > 0,∣∣∣Lt[HtXt +GtPt]
(1 + εLt)2
∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣εLt[HtXt +GtPt]
ε(1 + εLt)2
∣∣∣2 ≤ [HtXt +GtPt]2
ε
,
we see that the stochastic integral on the right hand side of (4.4) is a true martingale. It then
follows that
EQ
0
[Lεt ] =
1
1 + ε
− EQ0
[ ∫ t
0
εL2t [HtXt +GtPt]
2
(1 + εLt)3
dt
]
. (4.5)
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Next, we observe that Lt > 0, and
0 ≤ εL
2
t [HtXt +GtPt]
2
(1 + εLt)3
=
(εLt)Lt[HtXt +GtPt]
2
(1 + εLt)3
≤ Lt[HtXt +GtPt]2.
Note that Lε is bounded. By sending ε → 0 on both sides of (4.5) and applying Dominated
Convergence Theorem we can then conclude that EQ
0
[Lt] = 1, provided
EQ
0
[ ∫ T
0
Lt[HtXt +GtPt]
2dt
]
<∞. (4.6)
It remains to check (4.6). To this end, let us define Xt = X
1
t + αt, where dαt = ftαtdt+ dB
1
t , α0 = x,
dX1t = [ftX
1
t + gtPt + ht]dt, X
1
0 = 0.
(4.7)
By Gronwall’s inequality, it is readily seen that
|X1t | ≤ C
∫ t
0
|gsPs + hs|ds ≤ C
[
1 +
∫ t
0
|Ps|ds
]
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.8)
Here and in the sequel C > 0 denotes a generic constant depending only on the bounds of the
coefficients f, g,H,G, h, and the duration T > 0, which is allowed to vary from line to line. Now,
noting that Lt is a super-martingale with L0 = 1, we deduce from (4.8) that
EQ
0
[ ∫ T
0
Lt|X1t |2dt
]
≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ T
0
∫ t
0
Lt|Ps|2dsdt
]}
(4.9)
≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ T
0
Ls|Ps|2ds
]}
.
Consequently we have
EQ
0
[ ∫ T
0
Lt[HtXt +GtPt]
2dt
]
≤ CEQ0
[ ∫ T
0
Lt
[|X1t |2 + |αt|2 + |Pt|2]dt] (4.10)
≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ T
0
Lt(|αt|2 + |Pt|2)dt
]}
.
Continuing, let us recall that the processes P and α satisfy (4.1) and (4.7), respectively. By
Itoˆ’s formula we see that d|αt|
2 = [2ft|αt|2 + 1]dt+ 2αtdB1t ;
d|Pt|2 =
[
2Mt|Pt|2 + 2Ptht + S2tH2t
]
dt+ 2StHtPtdYt,
(4.11)
where Mt
△
= (ft + gt)− StHt(Ht +Gt), t ≥ 0. Next, we define, for δ > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ],
Xδt =
Xt
[1 + δ|Xt|2]1/2
; P δt =
Pt
[1 + δ|Pt|2]1/2
.
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Then |Xδt | ≤ |Xt|∧ δ−
1
2 and |P δt | ≤ |Pt|∧ δ−
1
2 , ∀t; and it is not hard to show that limδ→0Xδ = X,
limδ→0 P δ = P , uniformly on [0, T ], in probability. Now, define
dLδt = L
δ
t [HtX
δ
t +GtP
δ
t ]dYt, L
δ
0 = 1. (4.12)
Since Xδ and P δ are now bounded, Lδ is a martingale and EQ
0
[Lδt ] = 1, t ∈ [0, T ]. Furthermore,
by the stability of SDEs one shows that, possibly along a subsequence, Lδt converges to Lt, Q
0-a.s.,
t ∈ [0, T ].
Noting (4.11) and applying Itoˆ’s formula we have, for t ∈ [0, T ]
Lδt |αt|2 = x2 +
∫ t
0
Lδs[2fs|αs|2 + 1]ds +
∫ t
0
2LδsαsdB
1
s +
∫ t
0
Lδs|αs|2[HsXδs +GsP δs ]dYs.
Since α has finite moments for all orders (see (4.7)), the boundedness of Xδ and P δ then renders
the two stochastic integrals on the right hand side above both true martingales. Thus, taking
expectations on both sides above, and applying Gronwall’s inequality, we get
EQ
0[
Lδt |αt|2
] ≤ C, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (4.13)
where C is a constant independent of δ. Applying Fatou’s Lemma we then get that
EQ
0[
Lt|αt|2
] ≤ lim
δ→0
EQ
0
[Lδt |αt|2] ≤ C. (4.14)
Finally, noting (4.11) and applying Itoˆ’s formula again we have
dLδt |Pt|2 = Lδt
[
2Mt|Pt|2 + 2Ptht + S2tH2t
]
dt+ 2StHtL
δ
tPtdYt (4.15)
+Lδt |Pt|2[HtXδt +GtP δt ]dYt + 2StHtLδtPt[HtXδt +GtP δt ]dt.
By similar arguments as before, and noting that |Xδt | ≤ |Xt| and |P δ| ≤ |Pt|, one shows
EQ
0
[Lδt |Pt|2] ≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ t
0
Lδs[|Ps|2 + |Xs|2]ds
]}
≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ t
0
Lδs[|Ps|2 + |X1s |2 + |αs|2]ds
]}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
This, together with (4.9), implies that
EQ
0
[Lδt |Pt|2] ≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ t
0
Lδs[|Ps|2 + |αs|2]ds
]}
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Applying the Gronwall inequality and recalling (4.13) we then obtain
EQ
0
[Lδt |Pt|2] ≤ C
{
1 + EQ
0
[ ∫ t
0
Lδs|αs|2ds
]}
≤ C, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.16)
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By Fatou’s lemma one again shows that EQ
0
[Lt|Pt|2] ≤ C, for all t ∈ [0.T ]. This, together with
(4.14) and (4.10), leads to (4.6). The proof is now complete.
We can now complete the proof of existence. Since Lt is a (F,Q
0) martingale, we define a
probability measure P by dPdQ0
∣∣
FT = LT , and apply the Girsanov Theorem so that (B
1, B2) is a
P-Brownian motion on [0, T ]. Now, by looking at the first two equations of (4.1), we see that
(Ω,F ,P,X, Y,B1, B2) would be a weak solution to (3.1) if we can show that
Pt = E
P[Xt|FYt ], t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. (4.17)
To prove (4.17) we proceed as follows. We consider the following linear filtering problem on
the space (Ω,F ,P): {
dαt = ftαtdt+ dB
1
t , α0 = x;
dβt = Htαtdt+ dB
2
t , β0 = 0.
(4.18)
Denote α̂t = E
P[αt|Fβt ], t ≥ 0. Then by linear filtering theory, we know that α̂ satisfies the
following SDE:
dα̂t = ftα̂tdt+ StHt{dβt −Htα̂tdt}, α̂0 = x, (4.19)
where St satisfies (3.3) (or (4.1)). On the other hand, from (4.18) we see that α is F
B1-adapted,
and from (4.1) we see that P is FY -adapted, therefore we can apply Lemma 3.7 to conclude that
EP[αt|FYt ] = EP[αt|Fβt ] = α̂t, t ∈ [0, T ].
Now let us define P˜t = E
P[Xt|FYt ], t ≥ 0. Recall that X = X1 + α, where X1 satisfies a
randomized ODE (4.7) and is obviously FY -adapted, we see that P˜ = X1+ α̂, and it satisfies the
SDE:
dP˜t = [ftP˜t + gtPt + ht]dt+ StHt{dβt −Htα̂tdt}, t ≥ 0; P˜0 = x. (4.20)
Note that X = X1 + α and P˜ = X1 + α̂ we see that
dβt −H(t)α̂tdt = Ht(αt − α̂t)dt+ dB2t = dYt − [HtP˜t +GtPt]dt.
Then (4.20) implies that
dP˜t = [ftP˜t + gtPt + ht]dt+ StHt{dYt − [HtP˜t +GtPt]dt}. (4.21)
Define ∆Pt = Pt − P˜t, then it follows from (4.1) and (4.21) that
d∆Pt = [ft − StH2t ]∆Ptdt, ∆P0 = 0.
Thus ∆Pt ≡ 0, P-a.s., for any t ≥ 0. That is, (4.17) holds, proving the existence.
It is worth noting that the weak solution that we have constructed is actually a Q0-weak
solution.
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4.2 Uniqueness
Again we need only consider the solutions with deterministic initial state. We first note that if
(Ω0,F0,P,F0,X, Y,B1, B2) is a Q0-weak solution to (3.1), then we can assume without loss of
generality that F0 = FB
1,B2 , hence Brownian. Next, we can define P˜t = E
P[Xt|FYt ]. We are to
show that P˜t satisfies an SDE of the form as that in (4.1) under Q
0, from which we shall derive
the Q0-pathwise uniqueness.
To this end, we recall that, as a Q0-weak solution, one has P ∼ Q0. Define a P-martingale
Zt
△
= EP
[
dQ0
dP
∣∣Ft], t ≥ 0. Since (B1, Y ) is a P-semi-martingale with decomposition:
B1t = B
1
t ; Yt =
∫ t
0
(HsXs +GsP˜s)ds +B
2
t , t ≥ 0. (4.22)
By Girsanov-Meyer Theorem (see, e.g., [25, Theorem III-20]), it is a Q0-semi-martingale with the
decomposition (B1t , Yt) = (N
1
t , N
2
t ) + (A
1
t , A
2
t ), where N = (N
1, N2) is a Q0-local martingale of
the form
N1t = B
1
t −
∫ t
0
1
Zs
d[Z,B1]s, N
2
t = B
2
t −
∫ t
0
1
Zs
d[Z,B2]s, t ≥ 0,
and A = (A1, A2) is a finite variation process. Since by assumption (B1, Y ) is Q0-Brownian
motion, we have A ≡ 0. In other words, it must hold that
B1t = B
1
t −
∫ t
0
1
Zs
d[Z,B1]s, Yt = B
2
t −
∫ t
0
1
Zs
d[Z,B2]s, t ≥ 0. (4.23)
Consider now a (F,P)-martingale dMt = Z
−1
t dZt. Since F is Brownian, applying Martingale
Representation Theorem we see that there exists a process θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ L2F([0, T ]) such that
dMt = θ
1
t dB
1
t + θ
2
t dB
2
t , t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus (4.23) amounts to saying that
[M,B1]t =
∫ t
0
θ1sds ≡ 0; Yt = B2t − [M,B2]t = B2t −
∫ t
0
θ2sds, t ≥ 0.
Comparing this to (4.22) we have θ1 ≡ 0 and θ2 ≡ −(HX +GP˜ ). That is, Z = L−(HX+GP˜ ), the
solution to the SDE:
dZt = ZtdMt = −Zt(HtXt +GtP˜t)dB2t , t ∈ [0, T ], Z0 = 1,
and hence it can be written as the Dole´ans-Dade stochastic exponential:
Zt = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
(HsXs +GsP˜s)dB
2
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
|HsXs +GsP˜s|2ds
}
. (4.24)
Let us now consider again the following filtering problem on probability space (Ω,F ,P).{
dαt = ftαtdt+ dB
1
t , α0 = x.
dβt = [Htαt]dt+ dB
2
t , β0 = 0.
(4.25)
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As before, we know that α̂t = E
P[αt|Fβt ] satisfies the SDE:
dα̂t = ftα̂tdt+ StHt{dβt −Htα̂tdt}, α̂0 = x, (4.26)
where St satisfies (3.3). Since L
−(HX+GP˜ ) = Z is a P-martingale, we can apply Lemma 3.7 again
to conclude that EP[αt|FYt ] = EP[αt|Fβt ] = α̂t.
Now let Xt = αt +X
1
t , and Yt = βt+ Y
1
t as before, where X
1 satisfies the ODE (4.7), and Y 1
satisfies the ODE
dY 1t = [HtX
1
t +GtP˜t]dt, Y
1
0 = 0. (4.27)
Furthermore, since X1t is F
Y -adapted, we have P˜t = X
1
t + α̂t. Combining (4.7) and (4.26) we see
that P˜t satisfies the SDE:
dP˜t = [(ft + gt)P˜t + ht]dt+ StHt{dβt −Htα̂tdt}, P˜0 = x. (4.28)
Since β = Y − Y 1, we derive from (4.27) that
dβt −Htα̂tdt = dYt − dY 1t −Htα̂tdt = dYt − [HtP˜t +GtP˜t]dt,
and (4.28) becomes
dP˜t = [(ft + gt)P˜t + ht]dt+ StHt{dYt − [(Ht +Gt)P˜t]dt}, t ∈ [0, T ], P˜0 = x. (4.29)
That is, P˜t satisfies the same SDE as Pt does in (4.1) on the reference space (Ω,F ,Q0).
To finish the argument, let (Ω,F ,Pi,F,Xi, Y i, B1,i, B2,i), i = 1, 2 be any two Q0-weak so-
lutions, and define P˜ it
△
= EP
i
[Xit |FY
i
t ], t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. Then the arguments above show that
(Xi, B2,i, P˜ i), i = 1, 2, are two solutions to the linear system of SDEs (4.1), under Q0. Thus if
(B1,1, Y 1) ≡ (B1,2, Y 2) under Q0, then we must have (X1, B2,1, P˜ 1) ≡ (X2, B2,2, P˜ 2), under Q0,
which in turn shows, in light of (4.24), that P1 = P2. This proves the Q0-pathwise uniqueness of
solutions to (3.1).
5 Necessary Conditions for Optimal Trading Strategy
In this section we study the optimization problem (2.7). We still denote the price dynamics
observable by the insider to be V = {Vt : t ≥ 0}, and assume that it satisfies the SDE: dVt = [ftVt + gtE
P[Vt|FYt ] + ht]dt+ σvt dBvt , t ∈ [0, T ],
V0 = v ∼ N(v0, s0);
(5.1)
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and we assume that the demand dynamics observable by the market makers, denoted by Y =
{Yt : t ≥ 0}, satisfies the SDE
dYt = [βt(Vt − EP[Vt|FYt ])]dt+ σzt dBzt , t ∈ [0, T ]; Y0 = 0. (5.2)
We should note that in (5.1) and (5.2) the probability P should be understood as one defined
on the canonical space (Ω0,F0,F0), on which the solution to (5.1) and (5.2) is Q0-pathwisely
unique. For notational simplicity, from now on we shall denote E = EP, when there is no danger
of confusion. Moreover, note that
E[Pt(Vt − Pt)] = E[E[(Vt − Pt)Pt|FYt ]] = 0,
and that all the coefficients are now assumed to be deterministic, we can apply Proposition 3.8
to write the problem (2.7) as
J(β) =
∫ T
0
βtE[(Vt − Pt)PT ]dt
= φ2(T, 0)
∫ T
0
βtφ1(t, 0)
{
s0φ3(T, 0) (5.3)
+
∫ t
0
[(l2r + (σ
v
r )
2)φ21(0, r)φ3(T, r)− φ1(0, r)φ2(0, r)l2r ]dr
}
dt,
where φi, i = 1, 2, 3, and l, k are defined by (3.20) and (3.16), respectively, with H = β. Now by
integration by parts we can easily check that∫ t
0
[(l2r + (σ
v
r )
2)φ21(0, r)φ3(T, r)]dr =
∫ t
0
φ3(T, r)d[Srφ
2
1(0, r)]
= φ3(T, t)Stφ
2
1(0, t)− φ3(T, 0)s0 +
∫ t
0
φ1(0, r)φ2(0, r)l
2
rdr,
we thus have J(β) = φ2(T, 0)
∫ T
0 βtStφ1(0, t)φ3(T, t)dt, and the original optimal control problem
(2.7) is equivalent to the following
sup
β
J¯(β) = sup
β
∫ T
0
βtStφ1(0, t)φ3(T, t)dt. (5.4)
Before we proceed any further let us specify the “admissible strategy” and the standing as-
sumptions on the coefficients that will be used throughout this section. We note that the assump-
tions will be slightly stronger than Assumption 3.1.
Assumption 5.1. (i) All coefficients f , g, h, σv, and σz are deterministic, continuous functions
on [0, T ], such that σzt ≥ c, σvt ≥ c for all t ∈ [0, T ] for some constant c > 0;
(ii) the trading intensity β is continuous on [0, T ), βt > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ), and limt→T− βt > 0
exists (it may be +∞). Consequently, β △= inft∈[0,T ] βt > 0.
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Remark 5.2. (i) In practice it is not unusual to assume that limt→T− βt = ∞, which amounts
to saying that the insider is desperately trying to maximize the advantage of the asymmetric
information (cf. e.g., [1]). We shall actually prove that this is the case for the optimal strategy,
provided the Assumption 5.1-(ii) holds. In what follows we say that a trading intensity β is
admissible if it satisfies Assumption 5.1-(ii). By a slight abuse of notations we still denote all
admissible trading intensities by Uad.
(ii) For β ∈ Uad, the well-posedness of CMFSDEs (5.1) and (5.2) should be understood in the
sense of Theorem 3.11, and we shall consider its (unique) Q0-solution.
We note that the solution of the Riccati equation (3.17) S, as well as the functions φ1 and φ3
defined by (3.20), depends on the choice of trading intensity β. We shall at times denote them by
Sβ, φβ1 , and φ
β
3 , respectively, to emphasize their dependence on β. The following lemma is simple
but useful for our analysis.
Lemma 5.3. Let Assumption 5.1 be in force. Then for any β ∈ Uad,
(i) the Riccati equation (3.17) has a solution S = Sβ defined on [0, T ), such that Sβt > 0,
for all t ∈ [0, T ). Furthermore, there exists a constant Cβ > 0, depending on the bounds of the
coefficients and β in Assumption 5.1, such that Sβt ≤ s0 + Cβt, t ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) ‖Sβ‖∞ ≤ eKT (s0 +KT ), where K △= ‖σv‖2∞ + 2‖f‖∞;
(iii) Sβ
T−
△
= limt→T− S
β
t <∞, that is, the solution Sβ can be extended continuously to [0, T ];
(iv) Sβ
T−
= 0 if and only if limt→T− φ
β
1 (t, 0) = 0.
Proof. Let β ∈ Uad be given, and denote S = Sβ and φ1 = φβ1 , etc., throughout the proof for
simplicitly.
(i) First note that if St = 0 for some t < T , we define τ = inf{t ∈ [0, T );St = 0}. Then, from
(3.17) we see that at τ it holds that dStdt |t=τ = |σvτ |2 > 0. But on the other hand by definition of
τ we must have
Sτ−Sτ−h
h = −
Sτ−h
h < 0 for h > 0 small enough, a contradiction. That is, St > 0,
∀t ∈ [0, T ).
Next, let us denote, for (t, s, β) ∈ [0, T ] × (0,∞) × [0,∞), the right side of (3.17) by
G(t, s, β)
△
= (σvt )
2 + 2fts−
[βs
σzt
]2
.
Then for any β ∈ Uad, it holds that
G(t, s, βt) = − β
2
t
|σzt |2
[
s− ft|σ
z
t |2
β2t
]2
+
f2t |σzt |2
β2t
+ |σvt |2 ≤ max
t∈[0,T ]
{f2t |σzt |2
β2
+ |σvt |2
} △
= Cβ, (5.5)
thanks to Assumption 5.1. Thus St ≤ s0 +Cβt, for all t ∈ [0, T ], proving (i).
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(ii) To find the bound that is independent of the choice of β, we note that
dSt
dt
= G(t, St, βt) ≤ (σvt )2 + 2|ft|St ≤ K(1 + St), ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
where K
△
= ‖σv‖2∞ + 2‖f‖∞. Thus the result then follows from the Gronwall’s inequality.
(iii) Since G is quadratic in s, and lims→∞G(t, s, β) = −∞, it is easy to see from (5.5) that,
for any given β ∈ Uad,
max
t,s
G+(t, s, βt) = max
t,s
G(t, s, βt) ≤ Cβ. (5.6)
On the other hand, we write
St − s0 =
∫ t
0
G(r, Sr , βr)dr =
∫ t
0
G+(r, Sr, βr)dr −
∫ t
0
G−(r, Sr, βr)dr
△
= I+(t)− I−(t),
where I± are defined in an obvious way. Since I+(·) and I−(·) are monotone increasing, both
limits I+(T−) and I−(T−) exist, which may be +∞. But (5.6) implies that I+(T−) < ∞, and
by (i), I−(t) = I+(t) − St + s0 < I+(t) + s0, for all t ∈ [0, T ), we conclude that I−(T−) < ∞ as
well. That is, ST− ≥ 0 exists.
(iv) We rewrite the equation (3.17) as follows (recall the definition of φ1 (3.20)),
St = exp(log St) = s0 exp
{∫ t
0
dSt
St
}
= s0 exp
{∫ t
0
(2ft +
(σvt )
2
St
− β
2
t St
(σzt )
2
)dt
}
(5.7)
= s0φ1(t, 0) exp
{∫ t
0
(ft +
(σvt )
2
St
)dt
}
.
Thus, the result follows easily from (iii). This completes the proof.
In the rest of the section we shall try to solve the optimization problem (5.4). We first note
that by definition the quantity S and hence φ1 and φ3 all depend on the choice of trading intensity
function β. Therefore (5.4) is essentially a problem of calculus of variation. We shall proceed
by first looking for the first order necessary conditions, and then find the conditions that are
sufficient for us to determine the optimal strategy.
To begin with, let us denote, for any differentiable functional F : C([0, T ]) 7→ C([0, T ]) and
any β, ξ ∈ C([0, T ]), the directional derivative of F at β in the direction ξ by
∇ξF (β)t = d
dy
F (βt + yξt)|y=0. (5.8)
We first give some useful directional derivatives that will be used frequently in the sequel.
Recall the solution S to the Riccati equation (3.17), and the functions φ1 and φ3, defined by
(3.20). Note that they are all functionals of the trading intensity β ∈ C([0, T ]).
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Lemma 5.4. Let ξ = {ξt} be an arbitrary continuous function on [0, T ]. Then the following
identities hold, provided all the directional derivatives exist:
(i) ∇ξβt = ξt;
(ii) ∇ξSt = −φ21(t, 0)
∫ t
0
∇ξβrαrSrφ21(0, r)dr; where αt = 2βtSt(σz
t
)2
;
(iii) ∇ξφ1(t, 0) = −φ1(t, 0)
∫ t
0
[∇ξβrαr +∇ξSrρr]dr; where ρt = β
2
t
(σz
t
)2
;
(iv) ∇ξφ1(0, t) = φ1(0, t)
∫ t
0
[∇ξβrαr +∇ξSrρr]dr;
(v) ∇ξφ3(T, t) =
∫ T
t
{∇ξφ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)kr + φ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)[∇ξβrαr +∇ξSrρr]}dr.
Proof. (i) is obvious. (iii)–(v) follows directly from chain rule. We only prove (ii).
To see this, recall (3.17). We have
St(β + yξ) = s0 +
∫ t
0
(σvr )
2dr +
∫ t
0
{
2frSr(β + yξ)−
[Sr(β + yξ)(βr + yξr)
σzt
]2}
dr,
and thus
∇ξSt =
∫ t
0
d
dy
{
2frSr(β + yξ)−
[Sr(β + yξ)(βr + yξr)
σzr
]2}∣∣∣
y=0
dr
=
∫ t
0
{
2fr∇ξSr − 2Srβr
σzr
[βr∇ξSr
σzr
+
Srξr
σzr
]}
dr.
Denote S∇
△
= ∇ξS, we see that it satisfies an ODE
d
dt
S∇t = 2
[
ft − β
2
t St
(σzt )
2
]
S∇t −
2βtS
2
t ξt
(σzt )
2
= 2[ft − kt]S∇t −
2βtS
2
t ξt
(σzt )
2
, S∇0 = 0.
Solving it and noting that ξ = ∇ξβ and αt = 2βtSt(σz
t
)2 we obtain
S∇t = −
∫ t
0
2βrS
2
r ξr
(σzr )
2
exp
{∫ t
r
2(fu − ku)du
}
dr = −φ21(t, 0)
∫ t
0
∇ξβrαrSrφ21(0, r)dr,
proving (ii), whence the lemma.
We are now ready to prove the following necessary conditions of optimal strategies for the
original control problem (2.7).
Theorem 5.5. Assume that Assumption 5.1 is in force. Suppose that β ∈ Uad is an optimal
strategy of the problem (2.7), then
(1) it holds that
φ1(t, 0)(σ
z
t )
2
2βtSt
φ3(T, t) +
1
St
Φt =
∫ T
t
[βrφ1(r, 0)φ3(T, r) +
β2r
(σzt )
2
Φr]dr
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where
Φt = φ
2
1(t, 0)
∫ t
0
βrsrφ1(0, r)dr
∫ T
t
grφ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)dr.
(2) Furthermore, limt→T− βt =∞, and consequently, limt→T− St = 0. In particular,
PT = E
P[VT |FYT ] = VT , P-a.s.
Proof. Suppose that β ∈ Uad is an optimal strategy of the problem (2.7). Then it is also an
optimal of the problem (5.4). Thus for any function ξ ∈ C([0, T ]), it holds that
∇ξJ¯(β) = dJ¯(β + yξ)
dy
∣∣∣
y=0
= 0,
or equivalently,
0 =
∫ T
0
[∇ξβtStφ1(0, t)φ3(T, t) + βt∇ξStφ1(0, t)φ3(T, t) + βtSt∇ξφ1(0, t)φ3(T, t)
+βtStφ1(0, t)∇ξφ3(T, t)]dt. (5.9)
Then substituting ∇ξβ,∇ξS, and ∇ξφi, i = 1, 2, 3 in Lemma 5.4 into (5.9) and changing the order
of integration if necessary we obtain that, formally,
φ1(t, 0)(σ
z
t )
2
2βtSt
φ3(T, t) +
1
St
Ψt =
∫ T
t
[βrφ1(r, 0)φ3(T, r) +
β2r
(σzt )
2
Ψr]dr (5.10)
where
Ψt = φ
2
1(t, 0)[φ1(t, 0)φ2(0, t)− φ3(T, t)]
∫ t
0
βrSrφ1(0, r)dr. (5.11)
To justify the identity (5.10) we now show that both sides of (5.10) are finite for any β ∈ Uad
(note that it is possible that βt → ∞, as t → T−). To this end, we first note that φ1(t, 0) and
φ2(r, s) are bounded, and
φ3(T, t) = φ1(t, 0)φ2(0, t)− φ1(T, 0)φ2(0, T )−
∫ T
t
grφ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)dr, (5.12)
thus it is also bounded, and clearly limt→T φ3(T, t) = 0. Furthermore, we rewrite (5.11) as
Ψt = φ
2
1(t, 0)G(t, T )
∫ t
0
βrSrφ1(0, r)dr, (5.13)
where G(t, T )
△
= φ1(t, 0)φ2(0, t) − φ3(T, t) = φ1(T, 0)φ2(0, T ) +
∫ T
t grφ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)dr, thanks to
(5.12). We claim that the following integral∫ T
0
[βrφ1(r, 0)φ3(T, r) +
β2r
(σzt )
2
Ψr]dr
△
= I1 + I2, (5.14)
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where I1 and I2 are defined in an obvious way, is well-defined. Indeed, Assumption 5.1 and the
boundedness of S imply that, modulo a universal constant,
βtφ1(t, 0)φ3(T, t) ∼ βt exp
{∫ t
0
(
fu − β
2
uSu
|σzu|2
)
du
}
∼ βt
exp(
∫ t
0 β
2
udu)
. (5.15)
On the other hand, by (5.13) it is easy to see that β2tΨt ∼ β2t φ21(t, 0)
∫ t
0 βrSrφ1(0, r)dr, and∫ t
0
βrSrφ1(0, r)dr =
∫ t
0
βrSr exp
{∫ r
0
[
− fu + β
2
uSu
|σzu|2
]
du
}
dr
≤ C
∫ t
0
βrSr exp
{∫ r
0
β2uSu
|σzu|2
du
}
dr (5.16)
= C
∫ t
0
|σzr |2
βr
d
[
exp
{∫ r
0
β2uSu
|σzu|2
du
}]
≤ C exp
{∫ t
0
β2uSu
|σzu|2
du
}
.
Here in the above C > 0 is a generic constant, which depends only on the bounds of the coefficients
and β in Assumption 5.1, and is allowed to vary from line to line. Thus, similar to (5.15), we
derive from (5.13) and (5.16) that
β2tΨt ≤ Cβ2t φ1(t, 0)G(t, T ) exp
{∫ t
0
β2uSu
|σzu|2
du
}
∼ β2t φ1(t, 0) ∼
β2t
exp(
∫ t
0 β
2
rdr)
. (5.17)
But notice that βt ≤ 1 + β2t , and that for any δ > 0, we have∫ T−δ
0
β2t
exp{∫ t0 β2udu}dt ≤ 1− e−
∫
T−δ
0
β2udu ≤ 1,
we can easily derive from (5.15) and (5.17) that both I1 and I2 in (5.14) are finite, proving the
claim.
We can now use the identity (5.10) to prove both conclusions of the theorem. We begin by ob-
serving that limt→T− St = 0 must hold. In fact, multiplying St on both sides of (5.10) and then tak-
ing limits t→ T−, and noting that limt→T− φ3(T, t) = 0, we conclude that limt→T− Ψt = 0. But
then the equation (5.11), together with the fact that limt→T− φ3(T, t) = 0 but limt→T− φ2(0, t) 6= 0,
implies that limt→T− φ1(t, 0) = 0, and hence limt→T− St = 0, thanks to Lemma 5.3.
We now claim that limt→T− βt =∞. Indeed, suppose not, then we have
lim
t→T−
dSt
dt
= lim
t→T−
G(t, St, βt) = lim
t→T−
(σvt )
2 ≥ c > 0,
which is a contradiction, since St > 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ), and limt→T− St = 0, proving the claim.
Now note that St is the variance of the process Vt − Pt, t ≥ 0, the facts that limt→T− St = 0
and that both processes V and P are continuous lead to that VT = PT , P-a.s.. This completes
the proof of part (2).
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It remains to prove part (1). But note that φ1(T, 0) = 0, we see from (5.13) that Ψt = Φt, as
G(t, T ) =
∫ T
t grφ1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)dr. Thus (1) follows directly from (5.10).
Remark 5.6. (i) Theorem 5.5 amounts to saying that, similar to the static information case
(cf. e.g., [1,17]), the optimal strategy β for the optimization problem (2.7) should also maximize
the advantage on the asymmetry of information near the terminal time T , i.e., limt→T− βt = ∞.
Also, in equilibrium, such asymmetry of the information will disappear at the terminal time since
ST = limt→T− St = 0, that is, PT = EP[VT |FYT ] = VT , P-a.s., despite the fact that the insider only
observes Vt at time t < T (see also, e.g., [4, 10–12]).
(ii) Although Theorem 5.5 gives only the necessary condition of the optimal strategy, the
well-posedness of the optimal closed-loop system is guaranteed by Theorem 3.11. In other words,
combining Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 3.11 we have proved the existence of the Kyle-Back equi-
librium for the problem (2.3)—(2.7) under our assumptions.
6 Worked-out Cases and Examples
In general, it is not easy to find out an closed-form optimal strategy for the original problem (2.7),
although we somehow predicted its behavior in Theorem 5.5. In this subsection we consider a
special case for which the optimal strategy can be found explicitly. We show that it does possess
the properties that we presented in the last sections, which in a sense justifies our results. More
precisely, we shall consider a case where the market price does not impact the underlying asset
price, namely, gt ≡ 0 in equation (3.15). Recall from Lemma 5.4-(ii) that αt = 2βtSt(σz
t
)2
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Theorem 6.1. Assume that all the assumptions of Theorem 5.5 are in force and further that the
coefficient gt ≡ 0 in the dynamics (3.15). Define α0 ≥ 0 so that
α20
4
△
=
s0 +
∫ T
0 φ
2
2(0, r)(σ
v
r )
2dr∫ T
0 (σ
z
t )
2dt
.
Then, the solution to the optimization problem (2.7) is given as follows:
(i) the optimal strategy is given by βt =
α0φ2(t, 0)(σ
z
t )
2
2St
;
(ii) the error variance of price Pt
St = φ
2
2(t, 0)
∫ T
t
(α20
4
(σzr )
2 − φ22(0, r)(σvr )2
)
dr, t ∈ [0, T ]; (6.1)
(iii) the corresponding expected payoff is given by
J(β) =
α0φ2(T, 0)
2
∫ T
0
(σzt )
2dt;
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(iv) the market price is given by
Pt = E
P[Vt|FYt ] = φ2(t, 0)
[
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr +
α0
2
Yt
]
, t ∈ [0, T ];
(v) finally, it holds that lim
t→T−
βt =∞, limt→T− St = 0, and in particular,
PT = E
P[VT |FYT ] = VT , P-a.s. (6.2)
Proof. Let β ∈ Uad be an optimal strategy. Then by Theorem 5.5, we should have limt→T− St =
0, and hence φ1(T, 0) = limt→T− φ1(t, 0) = 0, thanks to Lemma 5.3.
Since gt ≡ 0, we have
φ3(T, t) = φ1(t, 0)φ2(0, t) − φ1(T, 0)φ2(0, T ) = φ1(t, 0)φ2(0, t); (6.3)
and (5.10) now reads
φ21(t, 0)φ2(0, t)(σ
z
t )
2
2βtSt
=
∫ T
t
βrφ
2
1(r, 0)φ2(0, r)dr. (6.4)
Now recall from Lemma 5.4-(ii) that αt =
2βtSt
(σz
t
)2
, we can rewrite (6.4) as
φ12(t) = αt
∫ T
t
βrφ12(r)dr, t ∈ [0, T ], (6.5)
where φ12(t)
△
= φ21(t, 0)φ2(0, t). Now differentiating with respect to t on both sides of (6.5) we
obtain that
dφ12(t)
dt
= −αtβtφ12(t) + dαt
dt
∫ T
t
βrφ12(r)dr =
[
− αtβt + 1
αt
dαt
dt
]
φ12(t). (6.6)
Now since g ≡ 0, we see from (3.20) that φ1(t, 0) = exp(
∫ t
0 (fr − kr)dr), φ2(0, t) = exp(−
∫ t
0 frdr),
where, by (3.16), kt =
β2
t
St
(σz
t
)2
. We can easily compute that
dφ12(t)
dt
= 2[ft − kt]φ12(t)− ftφ12(t) = [ft − 2kt]φ12(t).
Plugging this into (6.6) and noting that, by definition, 2kt = αtβt, we obtain that
dαt
dt
= ftαt, α0 =
2β0s0
(σz0)
2
. (6.7)
Solving the above ODE we get
2βtSt
(σzt )
2
= αt = α0 exp
{∫ t
0
frdr
}
= α0φ2(t, 0). (6.8)
28
Consequently we obtain that βt =
α0φ2(t, 0)(σ
z
t )
2
2St
, proving (i).
(ii) Note that S satisfies the ODE (3.17) and φ2(0, t) = φ
−1
2 (t, 0) = α0/αt, where α satisfies
(6.7), it is easy to check that
d
dt
(φ22(0, t)St) = φ
2
2(0, t)
[
(σvt )
2 + 2ftSt −
(βtSt
σzt
)2]
+ Stα
2
0
d
dt
[ 1
α2t
]
= φ22(0, t)
[
(σvt )
2 + 2ftSt −
(βtSt
σzt
)2]
− 2ftStφ22(0, t)
= φ22(0, t)(σ
v
t )
2 − α
2
0(σ
z
t )
2
4
.
Integrating both sides from t to T , and noting that ST− = 0 and φ2(0, t) = φ
−1
2 (t, 0), we derive
(6.1). Furthermore, setting t = 0 in (6.1), one can then solve
α20
4
△
=
S0 +
∫ T
0 φ
2(0, r)(σvr )
2dr∫ T
0 (σ
z
t )
2dt
,
proving (ii).
(iii) Combining the expression of β, S, as well as equations (5.3) and (6.3), the corresponding
expected payoff is
J(β) = φ2(T, 0)J¯ (β) = φ2(T, 0)
∫ T
0
βtStφ1(0, t)φ3(T, t)dt
= φ2(T, 0)
∫ T
0
βtStφ1(0, t)
[
φ1(t, 0)φ2(0, t)
]
dt
= φ2(T, 0)
∫ T
0
[α0φ2(t, 0)(σzt )2
2St
]
Stφ2(0, t)dt =
α0φ2(T, 0)
2
∫ T
0
(σzt )
2dt.
(iv) It follows from (3.23) and (6.8) that the market price follows the dynamics
Pt = E
P[Vt|FYt ] = φ2(t, 0)
[
v0 +
∫ t
0
φ2(0, r)hrdr +
α0
2
Yt
]
, t ∈ [0, T ].
(v) Finally, again by Lemma 5.3, one has limt→T− βt =∞ and limt→T− St = 0. In particular,
PT = E[Vt|FYT ] = VT , P-a.s.
We note that Theorem 6.1 contains several previously known results as special cases. We list
them as follows.
1. Static case. In this case Vt ≡ v, where v ∼ N(v0, S0).
Setting f ≡ 0, g ≡ 0, h ≡ 0, σv ≡ 0 in Theorem 6.1 we have
φ2(t, 0) ≡ 1, and α0 =
( 4S0∫ T
0 (σ
z
t )
2dt
)1/2
= 2λ,
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where λ
△
=
√
S0{
∫ T
0 (σ
z
t )
2dt}−1/2 is the so-called price sensitivity or Kyle’s λ (cf. [1]). The optimal
strategy is given by
βt =
α0(σ
z
t )
2
2St
=
( ∫ T
0 (σ
z
t )
2dt
)1/2
(σzt )
2
S
1/2
0
∫ T
t (σ
z
r )
2dr
;
and the corresponding expected payoff is given by
J(β) = S
1/2
0
( ∫ T
0
(σzt )
2dt
)1/2
.
Furthermore, one can easily check that, for t ∈ [0, T ], the corresponding market price is given
by
Pt = E
P[Vt|FYt ] = v0 + λYt,
and the corresponding mean square error is
St =
S0
∫ T
t (σ
z
r )
2dr∫ T
0 (σ
z
t )
2dt
.
In particular, ST = 0, which implies that V0 = PT , P-a.s. These results coincide with those of [1].
If we further assume that T = 1 and σzt ≡ σ, where σ > 0 is a constant, then the optimal
trading intensity becomes
βt =
σ√
S0(1− t)
, 0 ≤ t < 1,
the corresponding expected payoff is J(β) = σ
√
S0, and the corresponding market price is Pt =
v0 +
√
S0
σ Yt, 0 ≤ t < T . We recover the results of Back [2].
2. Long-lived information case. We now compare our results with that of Back-Pedersen
[4] (see also Danilova [17]), in which the insider continuously observes the dynamics of Vt that is
assumed to be a martingale.
By setting T = 1, f ≡ 0, g ≡ 0, h ≡ 0 and σz ≡ 1, Theorem 6.1 implies α204 = 1, assuming
S0
△
= 1− ∫ 10 (σvs )2ds, and the optimal trading intensity is
βt =
1
1− t− ∫ 1t (σvs )2ds, 0 ≤ t < 1.
The corresponding expected payoff is J(β) = 1, and the corresponding market price is Pt = v0+Yt,
0 ≤ t < T .
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